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THE CONTINUING CONFLICT OVER LIMITATIONS ON
RICO'S CIVIL INJURY ELEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of public outcry in the 1950's, Congress took action
to address the effects of organized criminal activity on the national
economy. Since then, Congress has conducted many indepth studies
and hearings to ascertain the nature and extent of this national prob-
lem. Of particular concern to Congress was the effect of organized
crime on the business sector as it related to interstate commerce;
in response, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)1 as Title IX of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act (OCCA) of 1970.2
Under both its criminal and civil provisions,' RICO proscribes
infiltration of business by organized crime.' Put another way, RICO
does not proscribe organized crime; rather, it is aimed at organized
criminal activity in all its multitudinous forms.' Therefore, RICO's
statutory language is necessarily broad.' To provide the courts with
1. 18 U.S.C. SS 1961-68 (1982).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, S 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
S 1961 (1982)).
3. The substantive elements of a RICO violation are the same under either
the criminal or civil provisions of RICO. The criminal and civil provisions of RICO
are distinguishable by their respective remedies. Under criminal RICO, a convicted
defendant may be fined no more than $25,000, or imprisoned up to twenty years, or
both and shall forfeit his ill-gotten profits to the United States. 18 U.S.C. S 1963(a) (1982).
Under civil RICO, a guilty defendant may be assessed treble damages, attorney fees,
and court costs. See infra note 57.
4. RICO can also be described as proscribing "enterprise criminality," the
infiltration of legitimate commercial enterprises by organized crime elements. See infra
note 58.
5. In re Cantanella and E.F. Hutton and Co., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1429 (E.D.
Pa. 1984). Congress rejected an amendment limiting RICO to members of the mafia
as underinclusive and possibly unconstitutional. Id. The concept of organized criminal
activity is broad; it "includes any criminal activity collectively undertaken." Id. (citing
116 CONG. REC. 35,293 (1970) (statement of Rep. Biaggi)).
6. RICO's broad language causes many interpretational difficulties. At the
very least, the courts do not agree whether RICO's broad language is plain or am-
biguous. This disagreement can have a significant effect on the attitude with which
a court approaches its analysis of RICO; a court may either apply the plain meaning
rule or use other interpretational aids. Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 171 (1980).
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interpretive guidance,7 Congress also included a liberal construction
clause with RICO.' One practical effect of RICO's broad language is
the federalization of a considerable number of fraudulent business
transactions.9
Remedies under RICO's civil provision include treble damages,
attorney fees, and court costs. ° Noting the treble damage action's
deterrent effect in the antitrust context, Congress expressly borrowed
antitrust language from the Clayton Act" when it drafted RICO's civil
remedy section. Congress did this to justify RICO's treble damage
action as a device to deter organized criminal behavior. 2 By enacting
RICO's civil remedy provision, Congress intended to provide a strong
weapon against organized criminal behavior.
From the time of its enactment until recently, the federal courts
disputed over the type of injury required in order to bring a civil
RICO action. 3 Some courts strictly interpreted RICO's civil remedy
section as requiring either a competitive injury or a "racketeering
enterprise injury."'" In contrast, more liberal courts did not interpret
7. Congress maintains some control over the courts' attitude towards a statute
through interpretational provisions. Id. at 182. Interpretational provisions also encourage
statutory construction which reflects the true congressional intent. Id. The Supreme
Court recognized the force of RICO's liberal construction clause in United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). Although Turkette involved an issue under RICO's criminal
provision, the Court clearly supported a liberal interpretation of the statute in accord
with its plain meaning. Id. at 587.
8. "The provisions of [RICO] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, S 904(a),
84 Stat. 922, 947.
9. See, e.g., Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 (noting that Congress deliberately
federalized some state law crimes). Many courts feel that this federalization of state
law crime creates an opportunity for prosecutorial abuse.
10. See infra note 57.
11. See infra note 71.
12. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1983) (language, but
not objective of RICO is identical to the antitrust law). See also Furman v. Cirrito,
741 F.2d 524, 531 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that concepts borrowed from Clayton Act pertain
to remedies and not to elements necessary to establish RICO claim).
13. One court has noted this confusion and described it as "conceptual disar-
ray and schism." Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1352 n.7.
14. See, e.g., Alexander Grant and Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., 742 F.2d
408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984) (racketeering enterprise injury); Moss v. Morgan Stanley,
Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983) (injury to business or property by reason of S 1962
violation) (emphasis in original); Willamette Savings and Loan v. Blake and Neal Finance
Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Or. 1984) (racketeering enterprise injury, which is
not necessarily a competitive injury); Richardson v. Shearson/American Express Co.,
Inc., 573 F. Supp. 133, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (requiring injury from S 1962 violation, not
mere injury from predicate act violation), disavowed by author, Laterza v. American
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RICO as requiring any specific type of injury other than injury to
business or property.'" The United States Supreme Court recently
resolved this conflict. In Sedima v. Imrex,'" the Court held that a civil
RICO plaintiff need not establish a special type of injury such as a
"racketeering enterprise injury."" Rather, the Court held that injury
to the plaintiffs business or property would be sufficient to state a
RICO claim, provided that the plaintiff alleged each element of the
substantive RICO violation.'8
While Sedima should quiet the conflict in the federal courts, the
debate over RICO's civil injury element still exists. The arena of this
debate has shifted to Congress, where the possibility of amending
RICO and the manner in which to draft the amendment is now under
consideration.' 9 This congressional study focuses on both the civil in-
jury element and the substantive RICO violation." At least in regard
to RICO's civil injury element, the arguments of both the proponents
and opponents of a RICO amendment are quite similar to those
arguments heard in the federal courts prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Sedima." Due to the similarity of these arguments, Con-
gress should not ignore the courts' experience in interpreting RICO's
civil injury element. As it now considers amending RICO, Congress
should utilize RICO case law in order to achieve a balanced resolu-
tion to the continuing civil injury element debate.
Broadcasting Co., 581 F. Supp. 408, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejects racketeering enter-
prise limitation); County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902, 920 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (injury by reason of S 1962 violation requires injury different from injury
by predicate act of mail fraud).
15. See, e.g., Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231,
1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (not requiring any injury above and beyond that injury caused
by predicate acts of fraud); Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery
Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (D.N.J. 1983) (refusing to dismiss for failure to allege
racketeering enterprise injury), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, both on other grounds,
No. 83-5575 (3d Cir. Sept. 6, 1984); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1352-53
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (rejecting argument that "something more than injury from racketeer-
ing activity must be alleged"); Windsor Associates, Inc. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp.
273, 278-79 (D. Md. 1983) (rejecting racketeering enterprise injury limitation).
16. __ U.S. ., 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985). The Sedima Court split 5-4. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor were in the
majority. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackman, and Powell dissented.
17. Id. at 3277.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 21 and 170 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
21. Blakey, The Act is Neither Anti-Business Nor Pro-Business, It's Pro-Victim,
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 26, col. 1 (discussing conflicting reports on RICO produced
by two special American Bar Association committees).
1986]
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A balanced congressional resolution must rest upon an examina-
tion of the issues which continue to underlie the conflict over the type
of injury required by RICO. This note offers such an examination by
first discussing RICO's legislative history and RICO's substantive
elements. Subsequently, this note analyzes the civil RICO injury doc-
trines as established by both the strict and the liberal constructionist
courts prior to the Supreme Court's Sedima decision.' Specifically,
this note discusses the purposes which supported each view and the
resulting scope and impact each view has had upon RICO
jurisprudence. Finally, this note suggests that Congress can fashion
a balanced resolution to the civil injury conflict not by amending
RICO's civil remedy provision but, rather, by amending other substan-
tive provisions of RICO. Such an approach by Congress would cir-
cumscribe RICO's breadth without completely sacrificing the effec-
tiveness or utility of the civil RICO cause of action.
II. RICO'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ITS LANGUAGE
The legislative history of RICO23 reveals Congress' concern for
the unchecked growth of both organized criminal and fraudulent ac-
tivity in government, business, and unions.2" By enacting RICO, Con-
22. At this point, the labels "strict" and "liberal" must be elaborated. The
labels do not necessarily refer to the mode of statutory analysis used by a court. Rather,
the labels mean to convey in shorthand form the resultant scope of RICO's civil cause
of action under a particular mode of statutory analysis. Specifically, a court adopting
the strict approach interprets civil RICO in such a way that a plaintiff must initially
allege a special type of injury, such as a competitive or racketeering enterprise in-
jury. Effectively, this requires a plaintiff to allege his injury as another substantivc
element of a RICO violation and also increases the plaintiff's evidentiary burden at
trial. Thereby, the strict approach narrows RICO's scope by precluding an enormous
number of plaintiffs from bringing civil RICO suits. See infra notes 144-54 and accom-
panying text. In contrast, a court adopting the liberal approach interprets civil RICO
in such a way that no specific type of injury is required. A plaintiff is required to
allege only injury to business or property in accordance with the language of S 1964(c).
The liberal approach neither imposes special pleading rules with regard to the plain-
tiffs injury or increases the plaintiffs evidentiary burden at trial. Thereby, the liberal
approach permits many more civil RICO plaintiffs to reach court for trial on the merits
than does the strict approach. It is submitted that Congress could not have intended
such contradictory results, although courts adopting either approach claim to be effec-
tuating congressional intent. This discrepancy in interpretation of the congressional
intent and statutory language has created a compelling issue under present RICO
jurisprudence.
23. See supra note 1. For a comprehensive analysis of RICO's legislative
history, see 1 CORNELL INSTITUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, MATERIALS ON RICO 1213
(1980-81).
24. The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, in part, states that:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 [1986], Art. 5
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gress believed that it would serve as a strong deterrent against
organized criminal and fraudulent activity.25 Ideally, Congress primarily
intended to remove the incentive to engage in unlawful conduct and
billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the
illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a
major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal
endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing
of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other
dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money
and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate
business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic pro-
cesses; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the
stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and
competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden
interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and under-
mine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized
crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering pro-
cess of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible
evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to
bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and
because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are un-
necessarily limited in scope and impact.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, S 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 922-23,
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. SS 1961-68 (1982)).
25. The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose goes on to state:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by pro-
viding enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Id. While Congress endeavored to create a new, strong weapon against certain unlawful
conduct, at the same time it was not insensitive to potential constitutional problems
that would arise if the statute were not carefully and precisely drafted. This concern
is reflected throughout RICO jurisprudence and in scholarly commentaries. For exam-
ple, one court has observed:
In drafting RICO, however, Congress was confronted with numerous con-
cerns as to the viability of a statute that would be restricted in its ap-
plication solely to organized criminals. From a constitutional perspective,
such a restriction might have been vulnerable to due process attack on
vagueness grounds. Additionally, the limitation might have been construed
as placing impermissible restraints on the First Amendment right of
freedom of association.
Windsor, 564 F. Supp. at 277. See also Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety
of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1107-08 (1982). The Windsor court also
recognized Congress' concern for the practical difficulties in RICO's courtroom
application:
[Gliven the inherent difficulties in defining "organized crime," several con-
gressmen voiced the concern that, if RICO were restricted to "organized
crime" members, proving a case under the statute would constitute quite
a difficult endeavor. Not only would it have to be proven that the defen-
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to eradicate its resulting harm, rather than to prohibit organized
criminal or racketeer status per se.
26
Congress has expressed its concern for organized criminal con-
duct and its injurious effects on the nation's economic and social health
for many years. In 1951, the Kefauver Committee,' the first Senate
dant being sued was affiliated with organized crime, but also the existence
of the organized crime, whatever, that might mean.
Windsor, 564 F. Supp. at 277 (footnote omitted) (italics in original). In short, the con-
gressional draftsmen did not go beyond proscribing a certain type of unlawful conduct
to distinguish between minor and substantial unlawful conduct. The result is that RICO
is a broadly-worded statute, just as Congress intended it to be. One law review article
has discussed RICO's scope and the concomitant distinction between minor and substan-
tial unlawful conduct by analogy to the "big fish" of organized crime. The authors
conclude that RICO could justifiably be used against the "minnows" of crime and re-
main within the intended scope of the statute. Strafer, Massumi, and Skolnick, Civil
RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 655, 682 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Public Interest]. "Indeed, one congressman argued that the broad
reach of RICO is necessary because those who prey upon the small businessman and
the consumer, the primary victims of organized crime, are not easily identified as 'big
fish."' Id. (footnote omitted).
26. The elusiveness of putting parameters on a concept such as prohibited
conduct as opposed to a concept such as prohibited status is a difficulty that Congress
knowingly accepted in drafting RICO. See Public Interest, supra note 25, at 681. By
doing so, however, Congress hoped to redress and eradicate the harm caused by such
prohibited conduct, as it was documented in various studies of criminal activity, not
any particular status. See, e.g., Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Hear-
ings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Govern-
mental Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE
MENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967)
[hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]. See also UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: EVERYONE'S PROBLEM, EVERYONE'S Loss (1974); GAMBL-
ING IN AMERICA: REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE REVIEW OF NAT'L POLICY TOWARDS
GAMBLING (1976); and PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMM'N, 1980 REPORT: A DECADE OF
ORGANIZED CRIME. By emphasizing conduct, Congress meant to avoid creating statutory
loopholes through which some criminals might slip. See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1354-55
("In short, Congress chose to provide civil remedies for an enormous variety of con-
duct, balancing the need to redress a broad social ill against the virtues of tight, but
possibly overly astringent, legislative draftsmanship."). Representative Pepper remarked
that harm from organized criminal activity "reaches out and takes some of the small
amount of money that the poor and underprivileged in our society possesses (sic)...
it threatens the very economic foundation of our society, since it substitutes threats
and violence for free economic competition." Organized Crime Control: Hearings on
S.30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970) (remarks of Rep. Pepper) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
27. The full name of the Kefauver Committee was Special Committee to In-
vestigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce. See generally S. REP. No. 307, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. REP. No.
2370, 81st Cong., 2d Sess (1950).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 [1986], Art. 5
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committee to study specifically the effects of organized criminal ac-
tivity, reported that organized criminal activity affected state and local
governments as well as legitimate businesses.' The Kefauver Commit-
tee reports focused on ways of strengthening then-existing laws and
also led to the realization that "the key to power in the underworld"
was money.' In 1960, the McClellan Committee' supplemented the
Kefauver Committee's findings by exposing the national breadth and
structural framework of the mafia as reflected in the labor and man-
agement fields." Congressional concern for the national crime prob-
lem was nearing its peak in 1967 when the Katzenbach Commission32
reported findings on and made recommendations for fighting against
organized crime's infiltration of business.' Equally important was the
28. Some of the infiltrated industries listed by one of the reports include adver-
tising, amusement, banking, boxing, cigarette distribution, communications, florists,
garments, import-export, insurance, laundry, liquor, news services, newspapers, radio,
real estate, sports, television, theaters, and transportation. S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 170-81 (1951).
29. House Hearings, supra note 26, at 544 (testimony of ABA president Ed-
ward L. Wright). Subsequent to this testimony, one congressional purpose underlying
RICO was to eliminate the economic power base of the underworld. The treble damage
provision of S 1964(c) embodies this intent.
30. The full name of the McClellan Committee was Senate Select Committee
on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. See generally S. REP. No.
1784, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960);
S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
31. See generally S. REP. No. 72, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
32. The full name of the Katzenbach Commission was the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. See generally PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N, supra note 26.
33. The President's Commission found that:
Control of business concerns has usually been acquired through one of
four methods: (1) investing concealed profits acquired from gambling and
other illegal activities; (2) accepting business interests in payment of the
owner's gambling debts; (3) foreclosing on usurious loans; and (4) using
various forms of extortion.
Id. at 190. One of the President's Commission's recommendations was to employ
regulatory devices against organized criminal infiltration of business. Id. at 208. Pro-
fessors Blakey (the Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedure in 1969-70 when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was processed)
and Gettings have noted that the President's Commission recommended using regulatory
devices against organized criminal activity due to the easier civil standard of proof,
the possibility of discovery, and the value of antitrust-type remedies. Blakey & Get-
tings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal
and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1015 n.25 (1980) (citing PRESIDENTS COMM'N,
supra note 26, at 208) [hereinafter cited as Basic Concepts]. "It was this insight (into
the advantages of using regulatory devices) that was the origin of the two-tract
approach-criminal and civil-of RICO." Id.
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work of the Brown Commission' which, between 1966 and 1971,
studied federal criminal jurisprudence and characterized significant
issues within the area of organized crime."
Congress first proposed the vise of antitrust-type remedies to
combat and to deter organized crime in 1967.' At this time, the Senate
introduced bills 2048"7 and 2049' (the Early Bills) as proposed amend-
ments to the antitrust laws. The Early Bills incorporated antitrust-
type remedies for use against organized crime's infiltration into
business. 9 The American Bar Association's Antitrust Section studied
the Early Bills and recommended that they be separate criminal
statutes, as opposed to being Sherman Act amendments. 0 The ABA
believed that this would avoid a commingling of antitrust and criminal
law purposes and would also avoid the imposition of such restrictive
antitrust concepts as standing and proximate cause.'1 As a result of
34. The full name of the Brown Commission was National Commission on the
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws. See generally Consultants Report on Conspiracy
and Organized Crime, I WORKING PAPERS: NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL
LAWS (1970).
35. See Blakey, The Rico Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett
v. Berg. 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 253 (1982) [hereinafter cited as RICO in Con-
text]. Some of the insights gleaned were pertinent to the approximate scope of RICO's
predicate offenses, concluding that "'ordinary commercial fraud' and 'crimes of violence'
should be included in RICO." Id. at 253 n.47 (italics in original).
36. The Justice Department's earlier successes against the spread of criminal
infiltration of various unions through the use of antitrust theories probably prompted
Congress to utilize antitrust theories in their legislation. See, e.g., Los Angeles Meat
and Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 103 (1962) (affirming ter-
mination of self-employed grease peddlers' union membership for illegal conspiracy
to violate antitrust laws); United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 357
F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1966) (affirming jury instruction in prosecution for antitrust viola-
tions by refuse removers with respect to activity required to bring defendants within
interstate commerce); United States v. Bitz, 282 F.2d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 1960) (charge
of conspiracy to prevent shipment of newspapers and magazines in interstate com-
merce to suburban distributors refusing to pay financial tribute to conspirators held
sufficient to charge antitrust violation).
37. S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
38. S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
39. S. 2048 prohibited the investment or business use of unreported income
while S. 2049 focused upon " 'investment' of proceeds from 'criminal activity' in a
'business enterprise.' " Blakey, supra note 35, at 254. S. 2049 also made actions for
treble damages, as modeled upon the antitrust laws, available as remedies to victims
of the proscribed activity. Basic Concepts, supra note 33, at 1016 n.27.
40. House Hearings, supra note 26, at 149.
41. The ABA suggested that the antitrust purposes of protecting free com-
petition was not well suited to furthering the goal of eradicating organized crime's
influence in the Nation's economy. Id. Antitrust standing is limited by the courts for
three basic policy reasons. First, a successful antitrust claim could impose ruinous
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 [1986], Art. 5
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these concerns, Congress took no action on either of these Early Bills.42
Congress nevertheless continued its effort to produce new and
stronger anti-racketeering legislation. In 1969, the Senate introduced
Senate Bill 30, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969 (OCCA). 3
OCCA provided for a broad variety of methods by which to attack
organized criminal activity's influence on society; it did not, however,
have any provision which could specifically be used against organized
crime's infiltration into business. This was remedied two months later
when Senator Hruska introduced Senate Bill 1623." Senator Hruska's
replacement bill supplanted the two Early Bills by combining the con-
cepts of each, namely, the prohibition of organized crime's infiltration
of business (enterprise criminality) and also the provision for private
equitable relief and treble damages."5 Congress specifically intended
the treble damage provision to deter enterprise criminality. After hear-
ings on both OCCA and Senator Hruska's bill, Senators McClellan
and Hruska drafted another bill, apart from OCCA, which replaced
liability on a defendant through its award of treble damages; this increased liability
could frustrate the promotion of free competition if antitrust standing is easily obtained.
Second, limiting antitrust standing avoids speculative damages. The final policy reason
for limiting antitrust standing to direct purchasers is to avoid the imposition of multi-
ple liability upon a single defendant. Tannenbaum & Molo, State and Local Govern-
ments' Use of the Treble Damages Remedy Under Civil RICO: A Means of Redressing
the Economic Effects of Unlawful Conduct, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 15 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Government's Use of Civil RICO]. The policy reasons supporting the restric-
tion of antitrust standing do not justify the restriction of RICO standing. Id.
42. At the ABA's suggestion, Congress subsequently redrafted the Early Bills
outside the antitrust context. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
43. S. 30, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 769 (1969). Various titles of
the Act include: special grand juries (Title I), 18 U.S.C. S 3321-28 (1982); witness im-
munity (Title II), 18 U.S.C. SS 6001-05 (1982); contempt (Title Il), 28 U.S.C. S 1826 (1982);
false statements (Title IV), 18 U.S.C. S 1623 (1982); protected housing facilities for
government witnesses (Title V), Pub. L. No. 91-452 SS 501-04, 84 Stat. 922, 933-34 (1970)
(reproduced but not codified preceding 18 U.S.C. S 3481 (1982)); depositions (Title VI),
18 U.S.C. S 3503 (1982); special rule for litigation concerning sources of evidence (Title
VII), 18 U.S.C. S 3504 (1982); enhanced sentencing for organized crime offenders (Title
X), 18 U.S.C. S 3575 (1982). See Basic Concepts, supra note 33, at 1017.
44. The Criminal Activities Profits Act, S. 1623, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 115
CONG. REC. 6995-96 (1969).
45. See Basic Concepts, supra note 33, at 1017; and RICO in Context, supra
note 35, at 258-61. Senator Hruska commented that the ."criminal provision ... [was]
intended primarily as an adjunct to the civil provision,' which he 'considerled] . . .
the more important feature of the bill.'" Id. at 261. Further commenting on the use
of the antitrust procedures in the organized crime context, Senator Hruska remarked
that "the time has arrived for innovation in the organized crime fight . . . experts
on organized crime will be able to conceive of additional applications of the law. The
potential is great." Id. at 261 n.65.
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both the Early Bills and Senator Hruska's earlier replacement bill.
This jointly-drafted bill, Senate Bill 1861, ' 6 was RICO's immediate
predecessor.
The jointly-drafted bill of Senators McClellan and Hruska pro-
duced significant additions and deletions to organized crime legisla-
tion in comparison to previous anti-racketeering legislation. The jointly
drafted bill expanded the list of "racketeering activities"4 7 in order
to broaden the scope of proscribed activity, but it excluded both vic-
tim treble damages and injunctive actions. The Senate made these
changes in order to streamline the legislation and to ease its passage
by avoiding complex legal issues." However, the inclusion of a man-
datory liberal statutory construction clause did strengthen the jointly-
drafted bill.49 The mandatory construction clause, which is specifically
directed to the courts, states that "[tihe provisions of [RICO] shall
be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. ' A
redrafted version of OCCA incorporated the jointly-drafted bill along
with the liberal construction clause, as Title IX, RICO, which the
Senate passed before sending it to the House.5
After being sent to the House, the House Judiciary Committee
both widened and narrowed the scope of OCCA.' One particular House
amendment to Title IX was significant, because it provided for private
treble damage actions.' By narrowing the list of racketeering ac-
tivities, Congress also narrowed OCCA's scope. The House then
returned its version of OCCA to the Senate.
Upon the return of OCCA to the Senate, Senator McClellan
argued for its immediate passage. Senator McClellan noted that the
House amendments had a "clarifying and strengthening" effect on
OCCA." Upon Senators McClellan and Hruska's suggestions that a
46. The Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969, S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REc. 9568-71 (1969).
47. The list of "racketeering activities" is a list of those state and federal
crimes which are commonly committed by racketeers. See infra note 60 for a list of
RICO's "racketeering activities." The racketeering activities are also called "predicate
acts."
48. Basic Concepts, supra note 33, at 1017-18.
49. Id. Senator McClellan & Hruska's jointly-drafted bill further strengthened
pre-existing proposed bills by the added provisions for civil investigative demands,
criminal forfeitures, use immunity, and divestiture of assets. See also Bradley, Racketeers,
Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REv. 837, 841-43 (1980).
50. See supra note 8.
51. Basic Concepts, supra note 33, at 1019.
52. Id. at 1020.
53. See H.R. 19,586, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 35,242 (1970).
54. RICO in Context, supra note 35, at 280. See 116 CONG. REc. 36,293 (1970).
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conference was not necessary,- the Senate waived a conference study
of the House amendments and accepted them. OCCA, with RICO as
Title IX, became law on October 15, 1970.'
The statutory language of civil RICO requires a plaintiff to allege
injury to his "business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962.""5 Under section 1962,58 a plaintiff is required to allege the ex-
55. Besides approval of the amendments there are other factors which also
might have affected the suggestion not to hold conferences on the House-amended
bill which might consequently have had a significant effect on judicial examination
of RICO's legislative history. Specifically, when the Senate was considering holding
a conference, both the end of that congressional session and upcoming elections were
nearing. Both factors could tend to encourage hasty completion of pending legislative
duties. See Basic Concepts, supra note 33, at 1021. See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Company, Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The clanging silence of the legislative
history [pertaining to the scope of the House's private treble damage action
amendment]").
56. 116 CONG. REC. 37,264 (1970).
57. The civil remedy section of RICO reads: "Any person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore
in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages
he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C.
S 1964(c) (1982).
58. Prohibited activities
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any in-
come derived, directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activi-
ty or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has
participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18 United
States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such in-
come, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in,
or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A
purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment,
and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control
of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under
this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the
members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pat-
tern or racketteering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after
such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the
outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law
or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeer -
ing activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or main-
tain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
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istence of seven elements: "(1) that the defendant (2) through the com-
mission of two or more acts (3) constituting a 'pattern'59 (4) of 'racketeer-
ing activity'60 (5) directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains an in-
terest in, or participates in (6) an 'enterprise'1 (7) the activities of
which affect interstate or foreign commerce. "2 Unfortunately, this
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any
of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. S 1962 (1982) (note that civil RICO has the same elements as criminal RICO).
RICO makes the collective, on-going activity, the type usually associated with organized
crime, an offense separate from the underlying predicate act violations. Catanella, 583
F. Supp. at 1423.
59. "Pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeer-
ing activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the
last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. S 1961(5) (1982).
60. "Racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in nar-
cotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which
is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States
Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports
bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659
(relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under sec-
tion 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension
and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit tran-
sactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling informa-
tion), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire
fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating
to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to
interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating
to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wager-
ing paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund
payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling
business), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of
stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband
cigarettes), section 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act
which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (deal-
ing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any of-
fense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the
sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving,
concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States.
18 U.S.C. S 1961(1) (1982). These are the predicate acts of RICO.
61. 'Enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. 5 1961(4) (1982).
62. Moss, 719 F.2d at 17.
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elemental breakdown of the terms of a substantive RICO violation
had not proved to be clear to the courts when they interpreted and
applied the statutory language of RICO.
For guidance in construing the terms of RICO's statutory
language, the legislative history reveals several matters pertaining
to congressional intent which deserve emphasis. First, Congress
assiduously avoided any status-based limitations, such as "organized
crime" or "racketeer." 3 Second, Congress enacted RICO apart from
the antitrust laws to avoid the imputation of the antitrust laws' restric-
tive standing requirements and proximate cause precedent. 4 Third,
Congress' deliberate extension of RICO to general commercial and
other fraud and its awareness of the significance of this decision is
also substantiated by the legislative history.65 Finally, Congress in-
tended the private treble damage provision to deter enterprise
criminality and to provide relief for substantive RICO violations.
RICO's statutory language and the congressional intent which
RICO embodies work together to create a statute of broad scope.
Originally, Congress perceived the organized crime problem as one
of great magnitude and as one which could permeate all aspects of
everyday affairs. Congress subsequently drafted RICO broadly to en-
compass the range of activities susceptible to organized criminal in-
volvement, to encompass all the participants of such unlawful activity,
and to separate those convicted defendants from their ill-gotten gains.
The statute's breadth is established through the wide-ranging list of
predicate acts which partially constitute a RICO claim. Such predicate
offenses as mail and wire fraud, bribery, and fraud in the sale of
securities allows the use of RICO against those not normally iden-
tified as "racketeers," since these offenses are commonly committed
in business fraud and "white collar crime" cases. Perceiving exactly
63. See supra notes 25 and 26 and accompanying text for a discussion of Con-
gress' rejection of status-based limitations.
64. The policy reasons which support limiting antitrust standing and their
inapplicability in the RICO context are discussed supra notes 41 and 42 and accompa-
nying text.
65. Congress drafted RICO so that the Act would cover a broad range of
unlawful conduct, including general fraud cases, because Congress perceived the organiz-
ed crime problem itself to be pervasive. See supra notes 24 and 25 and accompanying
text.
66. See supra notes 12, 36, 41, 45 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 60 for a list of RICO's predicate acts.
68. The way in which the federal courts gain jurisdiction over racketeering
claims under RICO is by the requirement that the enterprise's affairs affect interstate
commerce. Patton, Civil Rico: Statutory and Implied Elements of the Treble Damage
19861
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how broad Congress intended RICO's scope to be, however, was not
an inference necessarily available to the courts either from RICO's
or OCCA's legislative history or from RICO's statutory language itself.
The strict interpretational approach did provide one view of how broad
Congress intended RICO's scope to be.
III. STRICT INTERPRETATION OF CIVIL RICO's INJURY ELEMENT
Some federal district and appellate courts believed a broad use
of RICO was unwarranted since, in their view, a broad use of RICO
was based on a strained interpretation of the statutory language. 9
Objections to a broad use of RICO also arose from the effective im-
position of federal liability in addition to existing state liability for
business fraud claims." Courts expressing concern over RICO's breadth
typically emphasized the modeling of RICO's treble damage provision
after the enforcement provision of the antitrust laws and, by analogy,
imputed to RICO the same restrictive standing requirements as exist
under the antitrust laws." The courts expressly imposed these restric-
tive requirements to narrow RICO's breadth and to decide RICO
Remedy, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 377, 413 (1983). See Miller & Olson, Recent Developments
in Civil RICO, 8 CORP. L. REV. 35, 36 (1985) (under RICO, almost any kind of business
fraud claim can be pleaded as a racketeering activity). See RICO's list of predicate
acts, supra note 60.
69. Comment, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Racketeer or
Businessman?, 36 Sw. L.J. 925, 949 (1982) (arguing that a broad use of RICO causes
courts to diverge from the statutory purpose of uprooting organized crime; noting
RICO's applicability to common securities fraud claims).
70. See Seville Indus. Mach., 567 F. Supp. at 1157. For the view that RICO
is not meant to impose duplicate federal liability but rather to ruin racketeers
economically, see Note, supra note 8, at 1113. For a discussion of double jeopardy
issues as they relate to RICO, see United States v. Sutton, 700 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir.
1983) (consecutive jail terms for RICO and predicate act violations do not violate double
jeopardy clause); and United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) (federal
RICO indictments are not barred by double jeopardy clause when defendants have
previously been acquitted of predicate act violations in state court). See also Note,
Multiple Prosecutions and Punishments Under RICO: A Chip off the Old "Blockburger,"
52 CIN. L. REV. 467 (1983) (arguing that double jeopardy clause does not allow multiple
RICO prosecutions if predicate acts are common to all RICO charges but does permit
multiple punishment: state and federal liability); and Note, RICO and the Predicate
Offenses: An Analysis of Double Jeopardy and Verdict Consistency Problems, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 382 (1982) (analyzing relationship between substantive RICO offense and
predicate acts for double jeopardy and verdict consistency purposes).
71. The justification for this limitation is not derived solely from the
language of the statute. Instead, many courts focus on the fact that the
"by reason of' language is drawn directly from section four of the Clayton
Act. In that Act the language has been construed to require plaintiffs
to allege and prove an "antitrust injury," e.g., [citation omitted] which
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claims in conformity with assumed congressional intent. 2 The purpose,
scope, and impact of the strict interpretational approach is relevant
to any consideration of a civil RICO amendment.
A. Purposes of the Strict Interpretation Requirements
The purposes which motivated some courts to restrict the
breadth of RICO's civil injury provision were varied. Basically, these
courts claimed to do either one of two things: adhere to the plain
meaning of the statutory language or construe the Act in light of its
perceived ambiguity." This purpose was not dispositive, because the
liberal interpretational courts claimed to follow almost the same
method of interpretation. Specifically, the liberal interpretational
courts claimed to adhere to the plain language of RICO or to con-
strue RICO according to its broad terms."' Aside from a purpose based
the Supreme Court has defined as an "injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent." [citation omitted] By analogy, then, the
"by reason of' language of section 1964(c) is intended to limit standing
to those injured by a "racketeering injury," by an injury of the type RICO
was designed to prevent.
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494-95 (footnote omitted). The relevant antitrust language reads
"any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws my sue therefore . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Clayton Act S 4, 15 U.S.C. S 15(a) (1982).
72. "But there is simply no evidence that in creating RICO, Congress intend-
ed to create the broad civil cause of action that the reading of the statute given by
its proponents would allow." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 487. "Both of these [injury] restrictions
represent an attempt by the courts to narrow the application of RICO when used
in situations the courts perceive as not within the intended application of RICO ......
Pray, Application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
to Securities Violations, 15 SEC. L. REV. 373, 399 (1983).
73. The Sedima circuit court argued that the Act's ambiguous language caus-
ed the court to construe the statute in light of Congress' purposes for enacting RICO.
The court went on to cite United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,
543 (1940), for the proposition that even where the plain language produces merely
an unreasonable, but not necessarily absurd, result and one that varied with the general
policy of the statute, that the court follow that purpose rather than the literal words.
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488 n.17. See also Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 517 (2d
Cir. 1984) ("We regard [the distinct RICO injury requirement] as the plain meaning
of section 1964(c)."). But c.f. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 (noting that there is no certain
and errorless test for recognizing or labeling statutory language as plain or unam-
biguous). Apart from the ambiguousness or plain meaning of a statute, this note argues
that the judicial process of disregarding the statutory language to follow the perceived
general policy of the statute was not achieved by those courts which restricted RICO.
RICO's general policy is one of broad scope. The courts did not follow this general
policy for breadth when they restrictively construed RICO's treble damage provision.
74. "There are some ambiguities, to be sure, but the fact that RICO has been
19861
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upon the statutory language itself, those courts which restricted the
breadth of RICO's civil injury element were also motivated by con-
cerns beyond the statutory language.
The strict interpretational courts looked beyond the language
to effectuate the perceived congressional intent as revealed in the
legislative history."5 The legislative history shows that the general
intent behind RICO was to eradicate and to provide redress for acts
of enterprise criminality, or the infiltration of organized crime elements
into legitimate corporate enterprises." At least two courts, however,
noted the deficiencies of the legislative history in revealing congres-
sional intent as regards the scope of RICO's civil injury element.77
After noting the increased use of RICO's civil cause of action outside
the organized crime context, 8 at least one court justified its restric-
tion of civil RICO on this deficiency of the legislative history. 9 In
short, the strict interpretational courts perceived no express congres-
sional intent pertaining to the treble damage provision and, thereby,
used this to justify their court-imposed limitations.
The strict interpretational courts also justified their court-
imposed limitations on concerns for federalism or comity. Since many
of RICO's predicate acts' are based on violations of state law, RICO
has the potential to increase dramatically the workload of the federal
applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate am-
biguity. It demonstrates breadth." Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank and Trust
Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1985).
75. See, e.g., Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488 (finding it necessary to look at the con-
gressional intent behind RICO to construe its ambiguous terms); United States
v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding it necessary to look beyond the mere
isolated words of the Act and to the drafters' expressed intentions).
76. See Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, quoted supra, at
note 24. See also Sedima, 741 F.2d at 487 (RICO "was an attempt to deal with organized
crime as an economic phenomenon"); Ivic, 700 F.2d at 63 (stating that core purpose
of RICO is elimination of infiltration of business by organized crime elements; essen-
tial to determination of RICO's applicability is presence of mercenary motive by
perpetrators of the unlawful acts).
77. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492 (implying that silence of legislative history and
use of RICO in cases not involving organized crime should require courts to impose
limitations to best effectuate congressional intent); Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 517 (fin-
ding that silence of legislative history and adaptation of antitrust remedy to RICO
plainly requires courts to impose limitations on RICO's civil injury element).
78. The Sedima circuit court was concerned about damaging the reputation
of respected and legitimate businesses such as American Express, E.F. Hutton & Co.,
and Lloyd's of London, "to name a few." 741 F.2d at 487.
79. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492.
80. See supra note 60.
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courts." Some courts expressed their concern over the propriety of
this alteration of the federal-state court balance. These federalism con-
cerns and the lack of any clear statement," in either OCCA or the
legislative history, to federalize "garden variety" fraud cases' caused
some courts to infer that Congress did not intend to federalize so
many state law claims. These courts consequently restricted the scope
of RICO's civil injury provision based upon this inferred congressional
intent' and limited the types and number of cases to which RICO
would be applicable.
81. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding that refusal
to restrict RICO may cause extension of RICO's use to cases where redressability
was previously available in state courts only), affd en banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.
1983). This extension of federal jurisdiction alters the balance between the federal
and state court systems by reducing the state courts' jurisdictional authority and by
increasing the federal courts' jurisdictional authority. Hence, the federal docket is in-
creasingly burdened and concerns for federalism arise.
82. One commentator has recently discussed the significance of the "clear state-
ment" of congressional intent to federalize issues which were traditionally under the
states' authority. He argues that such a statement is necessary to prevent federal
intrusion into state affairs by forcing legislative debates on the issue of whether such
federalization should occur. Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO:
Sections 1964 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. L. REv. 100, 123-24 (1981). The Supreme Court,
however, impliedly has not adopted this view:
Congress nonetheless proceeded to enact the measure, knowing that it
would alter somewhat the role of the Federal Government in the war
against organized crime and that the alteration would entail prosecutions
involving acts of racketeering that are also crimes under state law. There
is no argument that Congress acted beyond its power in so doing. That
being the case, the courts are without authority to restrict the applica-
tion of the statute.
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587. Another court has adopted the view that the judiciary should
defer to Congress on this issue. Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1064 ("we are cautioned by the
Supreme Court that broad congressional action should not be restricted by the courts
in the name of federalism."). See also Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1355 (finding that federalism
arguments are nothing more than a dispute with RICO's design and not with its mere
application).
83. The courts using the term "garden variety" to describe certain fraud cases
do not explicitly define this term. Apparently, "garden variety" is a term of art meant
to distinguish ordinary or commonplace fraud cases from more sophisticated fraud
cases. Presumably, a sophisticated fraud case would involve many people, both
perpetrators and victims, and a complex scheme; it would require a lot of time, and
a lot of money would be at stake. Conversely, a "garden variety" fraud case would
apparently be small-scale and not involve extremely high stakes.
84. One court is of the opinion that, while RICO does bring some common
law claims within its purview, not all common law fraud claims are encompassed by
it, contrary to the arguments of RICO opponents. The specific types of common law
fraud claims within RICO's scope are those involving an enterprise which engages
in or effects interstate commerce. Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1064.
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B. Scope of Strict Interpretation Requirements
Courts which desired to restrict the scope of civil RICO through
its injury element commonly employed one of two means to accomplish
this goal. One method was to require that the plaintiff allege a com-
petitive injury." The other method was to require that the plaintiff
allege a racketeering enterprise injury.
1. The Competitive Injury Limitation
The competitive injury limitation required that the plaintiff be
indirectly injured in his capacity as a competitor." In other words,
a plaintiff who was harmed directly by a pattern of racketeering com-
mitted by or through an enterprise would not be able to recover
damages for his injury.87 For example, Business A, whose purchasing
clerk regularly made kickback payments to one of the company's sup-
pliers, would not be able to file a RICO claim against the clerk and
the supplier, because the net loss of money would directly affect the
business' finances. However Business B, which bought the same sup-
plies from the same supplier but which did not pay the lower rates
for the goods (assuming Business B is not paying kickbacks) would
be indirectly injured. Theoretically, Business B's ability to compete
with Business A would be lessened, and so, Business B would be able
to bring a civil RICO suit against the supplier, Business A's supply
clerk and possibly Business A if it could be proven that Business A's
intent was to participate in the scheme to weaken Business B's com-
petitive ability. Evidence incriminating Business A would probably
not be available where, as this hypothetical assumes, Business A was
unaware of its supply clerk's activities. In short, both Businesses A
and B would have suffered harm to their business or property by
the supplier and supply clerk's scheme. However, only Business B,
as the indirectly-injured party, would have been able to file a civil
RICO claim and have the opportunity to collect costs, attorney fees,
and treble damages.
The justifying rationale for the competitive injury requirement
is based upon an analogy between one of RICO's stated purposes and
85. North Barrington Development, Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211
(N.D. I1. 1980), was one of the first cases to require a competitive injury under civil
RICO.
86. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1431. The Catanella case has a good analysis
and discussion of both the competitive injury and racketeering enterprise injury
limitations.
87. Id. (noting that competitive injury limitation borrows indirect injury re-
quirement from antitrust law and incorporates it into RICO context).
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RICO's language to the purpose and language of section four of the
Clayton Act.8 One purpose of RICO is to prevent any interference
with free competition. 9 The purpose of the antitrust laws is to pro-
mote free competition. Moreover, the language of RICO's treble
damage provision is virtually parallel to the language of the antitrust
laws' enforcement provisions. 9° The strict constructionist courts used
these similarities to construe RICO's treble damage provision in what
appeared to be the most logical fashion91 and to incorporate the restric-
tive antitrust standing concepts into the RICO context. This approach
to judicial construction of RICO'S treble damage provision resulted
in the court-imposed limitation of the competitive injury requirement.92
Not all courts which adopted the competitive injury requirement
agreed on its essential nature. One court additionally required a causal
connection between the injury sustained and the section 1962 viola-
tion.93 Another court explicitly rejected the competitive injury require-
ment but did require a "commercial" racketeering enterprise injury,
which arguably more closely resembled a competitive injury than a
racketeering enterprise injury. 4 In spite of this disagreement, most
88. North Barrington, 547 F. Supp. at 210-11 (concentrating on RICO's express
purposes); Harper v. New Japan Securities Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1008
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (concentrating on similarity of language between RICO and antitrust
laws). While the North Barrington rationale was later rejected by the Seventh Circuit
in Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1358, the North Barrington rationale has continued to be ex-
pressed in one form or another by other courts. Shortcomings of the North Barrington
analysis must be noted here. While the North Barrington court validly stated that
one purpose of RICO was to prevent interference with free competition, the court
neglected to distinguish between different types of interference, i.e., economic, criminal,
political, etc. The North Barrington court also inferred and asserted, without suppor-
ting authority, that another purpose of RICO was not to transform state law viola-
tions into federal violations. North Barrington, 547 F. Supp. at 210. The problem with
this court-inferred purpose is that the court confused a possible objectionable side
effect of RICO prosecutions with implied congressional intent. The two are not necessari-
ly identical and should not be relied upon in deciding cases. See supra notes 65-68
and accompanying text.
89. See Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 24.
90. See supra notes 57 and 71.
91. Catanetta, 583 F. Supp. at 1431 (citing New Japan Securities, 545 F. Supp.
at 1007, 1008).
92. Id.
93. New Japan Securities, 545 F. Supp. at 1008. The causal connection require-
ment of the New Japan Securities court is probably more in the nature of a racketeer-
ing enterprise injury. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1431.
94. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137
n.1l (D. Mass. 1982). This case is very often cited in connection with the competitive
injury limitation.
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courts either rejected the competitive injury limitation95 or strictly
construed the treble damage provision through other means."
2. The Racketeering Enterprise Injury Limitation
The other method by which courts attempted to narrow the scope
of civil RICO was to require that the plaintiff allege a "racketeering
enterprise injury." Those courts which imposed the racketeering enter-
prise injury limitation implicitly assumed that there was a substan-
tive difference between an injury caused by the predicate act violation
and an injury caused by the civil RICO violation. The resulting prob-
lem was that these courts did not state what that substantive differ-
ence was. These courts subsequently required a plaintiff to allege
"something more" than that injury caused merely by the predicate
act violations. 7 The "something more" was what was commonly defined
as a separate, distinct racketeering enterprise injury."
The courts also attempted to define racketeering enterprise in-
jury by way of illustration. For example, one court described it as
a "loss of control over an ongoing enterprise due to infiltration by
use of two concerted prohibited offenses ... or a competitive injury
to a legitimate enterprise by that racketeering activity."" This at:
tempted definition seemingly blurred any distinctions between the
competitive injury and racketeering enterprise injury requirements. 00
95. See, e.g., Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1358 (stating a reluctance to undermine RICO's
deterrent effect by imposing competitive injury requirement); Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1059
(finding that RICO does not require competitive injury); Mauriber, 567 F. Supp. at
1240-41 (noting that competitive injury requirement is not consistent with RICO's
legislative history); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (finding neither express nor implied requirement for competitive injury).
96. See, e.g., In re Action Industries Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 851-52
(E.D. Va. 1983) (racketeering injury); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 720 n.6
(D.D.C. 1983) (RICO injury); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp.
352, 358 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (racketeering enterprise injury); Landmark Savings & Loan
v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (racketeer enterprise injury).
97. Evidently, the greatest difficulty with the racketeering enterprise injury
limitation is that it defies definition. Laterza, 581 F. Supp. at 414. A few courts have
even gone so far as to paraphrase Justice Stewart's famous remark in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963), to state that "courts recognize a racketeering enter-
prise injury when they see it." See Willamette Savings and Loan, 577 F. Supp. at 1430;
Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
98. Furman, 741 F.2d at 527; Seville Indus. Mach., 567 F. Supp. at 1157.
99. Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
100. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1435 (noting that the Schacht court impliedly
suggested that the two civil injury limitations were synonymous). See Schacht, 711
F.2d at 1356-58. See also Swanson v. Wabash, 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1319 (N.D. 11. 1983)
(noting that some authorities consider the two civil injury limitations to be essentially
the same thing).
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This attempted definition further indicates the difficulties courts en-
countered in establishing and describing the nature of the racketeer-
ing enterprise injury limitation.
In contrast, some courts held that "competitive injury" was not
synonymous with "racketeering enterprise injury." One court noted
that the two civil injury limitations might frequently overlap but also
argued that the two injury limitations were not necessarily identical."'
Others argued that the racketeering enterprise injury limitation was
.probably broader than or was perhaps "a more elaborate version" of
the competitive injury limitation.2
No matter how courts dealt with this elusive concept, the
racketeering enterprise injury apparently seemed to require some form
of indirect injury. The necessity of proving an indirect injury arose
from the strict constructionist courts' requirement of an injury that
was "something more" than injury from the predicate acts themselves.
"To hold that the injuries must be something more or different from
those flowing from the predicate acts is to imply that the damages
must be indirect. This direct versus indirect distinction harkens back
to the antitrust analogy."'0 3 The advantage of this analysis, moreover,
was that, while it harkened back to the antitrust analogy, it did not
explicitly adopt the antitrust analogy. The racketeering enterprise in-
jury limitation seemed to be the answer for those courts which desired
to limit civil RICO, yet which were reluctant to adopt the antitrust
analogy rationale. The only shortcoming of this approach was that
sometimes courts requiring a racketeering enterprise injury did ex-
plicitly rely upon the antitrust analogy to justify their court-imposed
limitation.' 4
Judicial discomfort with the scope of RICO's civil cause of ac-
tion was the most common justification for the racketeering enterprise
injury limitation. One court evidenced its discomfort with RICO's
breadth when it noted that imposition of RICO liability on top of an
already compensable injury was not within Congress' intent.'05 Those
courts which acknowledged the shortcomings of the antitrust analogy
and which expressed discomfort with RICO's scope could skirt the
101. Willamette Savings and Loan, 577 F. Supp. at 1429.
102. See Public Interest, supra note 25, at 707.
103. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1434-35 (emphasis in original).
104. Barker, 564 F. Supp. at 358 (court noted that other cases "have used the
same analogy to the antitrust laws to interpret [the civil damage section] as requiring
that plaintiff suffer 'racketeering enterprise injury' ").
105. Johnson v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (finding that
Congress did not intend S 1964(c) to provide an additional remedy for an injury already
compensable under the securities laws).
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more tenuous antitrust arguments and still restrict the use of civil
RICO through the racketeering enterprise injury limitation."' The
racketeering enterprise injury limitation, as well as the competitive
injury limitation, effectively narrowed the scope of the civil RICO
cause of action and the correlative opportunity to assess treble
damages against a defendant. However, these court-imposed limita-
tions impacted upon federal jurisprudence in additional ways.
C. Impact of the Strict Interpretation Requirements
The strict interpretational approach affected many diverse groups
within the legal system. The primary beneficiaries of a strict approach
to RICO were potential RICO defendants. The strict interpretational
courts narrowed civil RICO in order to check prosecutorial abuse in
business fraud cases; consequently, the use of RICO outside the
business fraud area was also curtailed. Specifically, in those cases not
involving pure business fraud, such as cases where organized criminal
involvement was apparent from the pleadings, a defendant would likely
not have to have been concerned about defending against a RICO
charge when the court required the plaintiff to allege a competitive
or racketeering enterprise injury."° The defendant would be practically
free of worry about a RICO defense due to the low probability that
a plaintiff would successfully plead either of these court-imposed limita-
tions."8
Alternatively, the strict interpretational approach decreased the
deterrent effect of the treble damage provision. These court-imposed
limitations effectively created loopholes through which some defen-
dants could slip."9 Even if a defendant had engaged in the very type
of unlawful activity proscribed by RICO, a plaintiffs failure to plead
successfully either a competitive or racketeering enterprise injury
106. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1434.
107. For a case in which the court explicitly refused to impose a competitive
injury requirement precisely because of this implication, see, e.g., Hellenic Lines, 523
F. Supp. at 248 (rejecting competitive injury requirement where plaintiffs suffered
harm to business and property and where pleadings sufficiently established the enter-
prise and pattern of racketeering activity through allegations of bribery, kickbacks,
and fraud).
108. See supra note 33; see also infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
109. An argument addressing the issue of this RICO loophole concerns the
possibility of frivolous private RICO actions and the escape valve which this loophole
provides. If Congress was as concerned with vexatious litigation as it was with deter-
ring and punishing unlawful activity, it would also have provided a cause of action
to stem frivolous civil RICO suits. Congress, however, did not do this. Note, supra
note 25, at 1116-17.
[Vol. 20
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would disallow any seemingly valid RICO claim against the defen-
dant."' A statutory construction which would allow targeted defen-
dants to escape liability is contrary to the aim of vigorous law
enforcement.
The strict interpretational approach adversely affected that group
of victims who were directly injured by racketeering activity. They
were adversely effected by the strict limitations since they were
denied standing to sue and were, thereby, left without the remedy
Congress specifically intended to provide."' The strict constructionist
approach inhibits at least this one aim of RICO: to provide "new
remedies to deal with the unlawful actions of those engaged in
organized crime. '"112
The roles of both Congress and the judiciary were also adverse-
ly effected by the implications of the strict constructionist approach.
The resultant loopholes for certain defendants and the denial of relief
to racketeering's direct victims frustrated the congressional intent
underlying RICO." 3 The resultant loopholes and denial of direct vic-
tim relief, by limiting the opportunity to assess treble damages against
certain defendants, did not further the congressional intent of
eradicating the economic base of those defendants who allegedly
violated RICO." 4 Consequently, the strict interpretational approach
also frustrated the legislative intent reflected in the statutory language
by the liberal construction clause."5 The role of the judiciary was
110. See infra notes 151-53.
111. "[The court] can imagine no construction of [the treble damage provision]
which would exclude from [its] coverage the primary victims of such [racketeering
activity] and which would render such defendants immune from civil sanctions." Mauriber,
567 F. Supp. at 1240. See also Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645
(N.D. Il. 1980) (person who suffered direct injury after investing in fraudulent com-
modities investment scheme has standing to sue under RICO).
112. Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 25.
113. The multi-faceted intent of RICO encompasses both the detection and deter-
rence of individual criminals and the eradication of the illegal profits the criminals
acquire. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593. The strict constructionist courts seemed to overlook
this dual purpose when they focused upon the express purpose of avoiding interference
with free competition, as noted in the Congressional Statement of Findings and Pur-
pose, when they borrowed from the antitrust laws to limit RICO's use to only in-
directly injured victims.
114. "The aim [of RICO] is to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten
gains." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 585.
115. The liberal construction clause should be used as a guide to discern and
carry out, not frustrate, the legislative will as reflected in the statutory language.
To do otherwise would obstruct expressly-adopted social policy. Note, Liberal Con-
struction of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: Section 904(a) v. The
Doctrine of Strict Construction, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 69, 74-77 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
1986]
Gloss: The Continuing Conflict Over Limitations on RICO'S Civil Injury E
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1986
554 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
similarly altered when the courts imposed a strict construction upon
civil RICO. Those cases requiring special injury limitations establish-
ed a body of precedent which allowed for judicial law-making."6 The
strict constructionist approach, therefore, effectively diminished the
power of Congress to make certain decisions and simultaneously ex-
panded the judiciary's power to make those same decisions."7
The competitive injury and racketeering enterprise injury limita-
tions do effectively limit the potential for prosecutorial abuse which
is inherent under RICO. Notwithstanding the difficulties these limita-
tions place before individual plaintiffs, though, the underlying ra-
tionales of the strict interpretational courts increased rather then
decreased the uncertainties already pertaining to this relatively new
statute. The more liberal courts, however, provided an alternative
perspective and approach by which RICO's civil injury element could
be construed.
IV. LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF CIVIL RICO's
INJURY ELEMENT
Those courts which liberally interpreted RICO's civil injury ele-
ment did not develop any concepts analogous to either the competitive
injury or racketeering enterprise injury concepts. The liberal inter-
pretational courts typically focused upon the specific elements of a
substantive RICO violation, as required by section 1962. Assuming
those specific elements were pleaded, the liberal interpretational courts
did not go further and require that an injured plaintiff plead a specific
type of injury."8 The liberal interpretational courts objected to the
Liberal Construction of Title IX]. "The clause, however, is not an invitation to the
courts to expand the scope of RICO to the outer limits of imagination; rather, it is
an instruction to the courts not to narrowly construe a statute meant to have broad
application." Id. at 77. "Because no constitutional impediments deny Congress' ability
to provide interpretational clauses, courts have no basis for refusing to obey the ex-
press liberal construction mandate in civil RICO." Note, supra note 6, at 184.
116. Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather Than
the Statute Itself?., 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 777 (1980).
117. Cf. Haroco, 747 F.2d 384 at 399 (7th Cir. 1985) (such judicial activism would
be warranted if the safety or stability "of the Republic" demanded it). The courts
tended to confuse the aspect of the occasion for enacting RICO (organized crime) with
the statute's scope (enterprise criminality). Basic Concepts, supra note 33, at 1019 n.55.
118. One reaches this conclusion by examining the method of analysis used
by the liberal courts. The liberal courts typically analyze the competitive and racketeer-
ing enterprise injury limitations and advance their arguments for rejection of the limita-
tions. The liberal courts then concentrate their analysis upon each of the substantive
elements required by section 1962 to determine whether the plaintiff's claim should
be dismissed at the pleading stage. The result is that sufficient compliance in alleging
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seemingly apparent frustration of congressional intent and misapplica-
tion of the statute's plain language which, they felt, a narrow use
of civil RICO would cause."9 Therefore, those courts which construed
RICO broadly did so primarily in reliance upon the statute's plain
meaning, the liberal construction clause, the concern to prevent the
creation of statutory loopholes, and the reluctance to engage in judicial
law-making. The insights acquired by examining the purpose, scope,
and impact of the liberal interpretational approach are also relevant
to the issue of whether Congress should amend RICO's civil remedy
provision.
A. Purposes of the Liberal Interpretational Approach
The threefold purposes of those courts which broadly construed
civil RICO focused upon the statutory language, congressional intent,
and the role of the judiciary. The liberal constructionist courts first
looked at the statute's language to determine the scope of congres-
sional intent behind it.'20 These courts based their statutory analysis
upon a principle of statutory construction which provides that "ab-
sent clear evidence of a contrary, legislative intention, a statute should
be interpreted according to its plain language."'' This principle re-
quires an examination of the statutes for words of express limitation
and for words which are logically and reasonably subject to a restric-
tive limitation.'2 2 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Turkette,23
RICO's substantive elements saves the complaint from dismissal, and the case is allowed
to proceed. For a thorough list of cases which follow this method in rejecting the
competitive injury limitation and for a persuasive argument rejecting the racketeer
enterprise limitation, see Cantanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1431-32, 1434-37.
119. See, e.g., Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d
1272, 1288 (7th Cir. 1983) (narrow reading disagrees with RICO's plain meaning and
congressional intent); Eisenberg, 564 F. Supp. at 1353-54 (bound by the Turkette Court's
broad reading of statute and by underlying federal policy); Windsor, 564 F. Supp. at
279 (restrictive reading of RICO violates liberal meaning of statute and congressional
intent).
120. See, e.g., Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 (first look to statutory language to deter-
mine statute's scope); Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 518 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (deter-
mining statute's scope logically requires first looking at its language).
121. Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 518 (citing United States v. Apfelbaum, 445
U.S. 115, 121 (1980)). The Turkette Court has similarly phrased this Joctrine of statutory
construction. 452 U.S. at 580 (citing Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)) ("[Notwithstanding] a clearly expressed legislative intent
to the contrary, [the statute's] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.").
122. The mechanics of this doctrine of statutory construction implicitly re-
quire this form of analysis: Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 519.
123. 452 U.S. 576.
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began its analysis of criminal RICO's'24 enterprise element with this
doctrine of statutory construction. The Turkette Court held RICO's
"enterprise" element encompassed both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises. 2 ' The Turkette Court found no express restrictions upon
the various associations encompassed by RICO's statutory definition
of "enterprise"'2 6 and rejected the lower court's rationale for limiting
the term to encompass only legitimate enterprises as being inadequate.
The Court neither found any uncertainty in the language or struc-
ture of RICO's statutory definition nor did it find that any internal
inconsistencies were created when the enterprise element was con-
strued broadly. 27 Consequently, the Turkette Court refused to limit
the scope of the enterprise element.
The arguments of those courts which broadly construed RICO's
treble damage provision are analogous to the arguments supporting
a liberal construction of RICO's enterprise element advanced by the
Turkette Court.2 8 The treble damage provision authorizes "any per-
son" injured in his "business or property" by a violation of section
1962 to sue and "recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."'" The liberal
constructionist courts found no express terms of limitation in this
language.' The liberal view also found no implicit restrictive limita-
tions discernible within the statutory language. 3' Civil RICO requires
124. See supra note 3.
125. 452 U.S. at 580.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 581, 585.
128. Three Second Circuit cases reflect an amalgam of the arguments advanced
by other liberal courts and also cite to opinions of those courts. See Sedima, 741 F.2d
at 508-10 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (advances various policy arguments for not restrict-
ing RICO which are analogous to those policy arguments advanced by the Turkette
Court; cannot sanction a veiled attempt to limit RICO to organize crime; legislative
history does not support limited reading; judicial creativity produces inconsistency
and confusion); Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 518-20 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (analyzes
explicit and implicit meaning of statutory language and examines legislative history);
Furman, 741 F.2d at 527-30 (analyses both RICO's language and legislative history
concluding that narrow reading is contrary to a correct interpretation). The Furman
case is interesting for holding that a special RICO injury is required but also for ex-
pressing the opinion that a special injury should not be required. The reason for this
inconsistency is that the Furman court felt bound by the precedent established by
Sedima and Bankers Trust, cases which were decided by different panels of the court.
129. See supra note 57 for the full quote of the treble damage provision.
130. See, e.g., Haroco, 747 F.2d at 392, 398 (Congress chose broad terms to
ensure the effectiveness of both the criminal and civil provisions; language is extraor-
dinarily broad, not ambiguous).
131. E.g., Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 519 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (finding
neither express words of limitation nor language susceptible of restrictive limitation).
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an "injury" which, the liberal courts argued, logically included any
injury by reason of a section 1962 violation. 32 The meaning of
"business" was taken to mean any commercial undertaking;" "property"
was taken to mean "'anything of material value owned or possessed,'
including the presently possessed right to receive something of
material value in the future."'134 These courts also used the mandate
of the liberal construction clause to justify a broad construction of
civil RICO's treble damage provision.'35 These courts, consequently,
did not dismiss the RICO claim at the pleading stage for failure to
allege a special type of injury, as the strict constructionist courts
would have done. Instead, if the complaint adequately alleged all the
substantive elements of a section 1962 violation, the liberal interpreta-
tional courts found civil RICO's injury language to be broad and
allowed the RICO claim to proceed.
Additionally, the liberal interpretational courts also examined
RICO's legislative history for evidence of intent which was contrary
to a broad construction of the statutory language." The legislative
history revealed the extent of the national crime problem and its ef-
fect on the national economy.'37 Congress reacted to this problem by
commissioning studies of the crime problem and by proposing various
bills aimed at the eradication of this problem and its effects on the
economy. The liberal courts noted that RICO's legislative history
showed Congress' concern for the potential constitutional problems
inherent with status-based legislation, laws proscribing organized crime
per se, and the impossibility of defining a generic term such as
"organized crime." ' To avoid these problems, Congress refused to
proscribe any particular group of persons or organizations but, rather,
chose to proscribe that type of conduct affecting the national economy
132. RICO was designed to protect both direct and second-order victims of
organized crime infiltration. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1358. Since RICO grants civil relief
for "injury," this logically includes any injury to business or property. Furman, 741
F.2d at 528.
133. "Business" also includes a person's employment. Public Interest, supra note
25, at 690.
134. Id. at 691. For another author's view that the meaning of "business or
property" should be interpreted broadly, see Government's Use of Civil Rico, supra
note 41, at 15.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
136. This step in the analysis of RICO's civil injury element is required by
the doctrine of statutory construction which the liberal courts utilize. See supra text
accompanying note 121 for a statement of this doctrine of statutory construction:
137. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text for a more detailed discus-
sion of the national crime problem and its effects on the economy.
138. See supra note 25.
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typically committed by organized criminals."a9 The liberal construc-
tionist courts found that the congressional intent underlying this
legislative decision was to rid society of commercial criminal activities
regardless of the group committing them. The basic congressional goal,
as the liberal courts read the legislative history, was to encompass
a wide range of criminal business activities, notwithstanding the fact
that many persons not associated with a criminal organization would
be liable under RICO for their own illegal conduct. Since an additional
congressional goal was to remove the financial power base accruing
from such criminal activity, the liberal courts viewed a broad con-
struction of the treble damage provision as a means of furthering this
goal and a proper application of the statutory language. " °
To stay within the proper judicial boundaries, the liberal courts
also felt obliged to construe civil RICO's injury element broadly, since
the plain meaning of the statute's language and its legislative history
supported such a construction. The liberal courts typically noted the
potential expanse of civil RICO but also disavowed any judicial duty
to reassess the costs and benefits of civil RICO litigation.' These
courts considered that duty as more properly belonging to the
legislature. "2 The liberal courts argued that doing otherwise, by im-
posing restrictive limitations on civil RICO's injury element, would
constitute both judicial activism and a usurpation of legislative func-
tions."' The liberal courts further justified a broad interpretation of
the injury element, therefore, as part of their judicial duty to con-
strue RICO in accord with the overall broad congressional strategy
139. E.g., Haroco, 747 F.2d at 391 (noting that Congress' concerns extended
much farther than preventing injury to free competition in the market place). In order
to cover the wide range of activities dominated by organized crime, Congress deliberate-
ly drafted RICO broadly in spite of the risk that others not associated with organized
crime would come within RICO's purview. See Bradley, supra note 49, at 845.
140. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983) (Congress enacted
RICO primarily to attack the sources of organized crime's economic power). The assess-
ment of treble damages would financially ruin some defendants. Arguably, putting
some types of defendants out of business would advance RICO's goals. Basic Concepts,
.upra note 23, at 1042.
141. It is not the "judiciary's] role to reassess the costs and benefits associated
with the creation of a dramatically expansive ... tool for combatting organized crime."
Moss, 719 F.2d at 21, quoting Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1361, citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586-87.142. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588 (IClourts are without authority to restrict the
application of the statute.").
143. See id. at 586-87; Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1355 (court cannot "reassess the
balance struck" by Congress); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 399 (limiting RICO disturbs "the
policy choices Congress has made"). Since the pleading stage involves small stakes,
such as legal fees and the sensibilities of defendants alleged to be "racketeers," the
courts cannot reject Congress' policy choices by restrictively limiting RICO. Id.
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as expressed in the statute. In light of the Sedima Court's ratifica-
tion of the liberal interpretational approach, the scope of civil RICO's
injury element is very broad.
B. Scope of the Liberal Interpretational Approach
The scope of civil RICO's injury element under the liberal inter-
pretational approach is so broad that almost any type of injury to
the plaintiffs business or property is sufficient to grant standing. The
liberal interpretational courts found that no specialized type of injury
was warranted under RICO due to the nature of a substantive RICO
violation as established by section 1962.'" Consequently, the liberal
courts focused upon the sufficiency of the allegations of RICO's
substantive elements in deciding whether to grant dismissal of the
RICO claim. Any injury caused by RICO's predicate act violations was
held sufficient to grant standing, assuming all the other RICO elements
were properly alleged. Since the scope of RICO's predicate act viola-
tions is broad, including violations as diverse as kidnapping, obstruc-
tion of justice, and fraud in the sale of securities, the scope of in-
juries recognized by the liberal courts was also broad."5
More specifically, racketeering under RICO is comprised of
predicate acts which are described by reference to other federal and
state law crimes.14 RICO does not therefore, proscribe the federal
and state law violations per se. 47 However, two or more of these viola-
tions can constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO
if the pattern of racketeering activity is connected to an enterprise
which affects interstate commerce. 48 The Turkette Court has described
144. The acts which RICO proscribes relate to the interaction between an in-
terstate enterprise and a pattern of racketeering. Seville, 567 F. Supp. at 1149. Conse-
quently, a plaintiff must allege the existence of an interstate enterprise and the defen-
dant's participation in both the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise.
Id. at 1150.
145. RICO is a remedial statute; its purpose is to remedy the evil of the in-
filtration and corruption of legitimate organizations. Note, supra note 115, at 77.
Therefore, RICO's civil remedy is applicable to an enormous variety of conduct. Schacht,
711 F.2d at 1354.
146. One court which has discussed this observation of RICO has stated that
RICO proscribes "racketeering," not the state offenses which are listed as the predicate
acts under section 1961(1). RICO uses these enumerated offenses for definitional pur-
poses only. Frumento, 563 F.2d at 1087. Consequently, RICO can provide a successful
plaintiff a remedy which is either alternate or cumulative to remedies available under
other laws.
147. Id.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) states the conditions under which two or more
predicate acts may constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982)
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an enterprise to be any formal or informal group of individuals or
an organization which functions as a continuing entity.' 9 In short, a
substantive violation of section 1962 involves the commission of a pat-
tern of racketeering activity which affects the operation of or par-
ticipation in the affairs of an interstate enterprise.' 50
The character of a substantive RICO violation is also understood
in terms of the plaintiffs evidentiary burden at trial. Evidentiary proof
of a RICO violation requires not only proof of all the elements of the
predicate act violations themselves but also requires proof of the enter-
prise's existence, proof of the enterprise's continuity, proof of a pattern
of racketeering activity, and proof of the connection between the pat-
tern of racketeering activity and the enterprise. 5 ' The plaintiffs in-
creased burden of proving the enterprise and pattern of racketeering
elements is what distinguishes a RICO violation from the predicate
state law violations. 5W Recognizing this substantial evidentiary burden
which the RICO plaintiff must carry, the liberal courts refused to in-
crease this burden by requiring either a competitive or racketeering
enterprise injury. 53 Apparently, the liberal courts justified this deci-
sion on the basis that since the enterprise and pattern of racketeer-
ing activity elements, and not the injury element, distinguish a RICO
violation from the predicate state law violations, the courts were not
free to increase the burden already imposed by the statute.
proscribes that pattern of racketeering activity which is connected to an enterprise
affecting interstate commerce. The different subsections of section 1962 list the dif-
ferent ways in which a pattern of racketeering activity connected to an enterprise
are made illegal.
149. 452 U.S. at 583.
150. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1434.
151. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. The enterprise is proved by evidence of an
organization or group of persons and by evidence that the organization or group acts
as an on-going entity. The connected pattern of racketeering activity is proved by
evidence of at least two predicate acts committed by the participants of the acts who
are affiliated with the enterprise. Id. The plaintiff is not required to prove that either
the defendants' conduct or the racketeering acts themselves affect interstate commerce;
only the enterprise itself or its activities must affect interstate commerce. Patton,
suapra note 68, at 414.
152. RICO prohibits the predicate state law violations only insofar as an enter-
prise is involved. Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060 (proof of "enterprise" is proof of an addi-
tional fact not required to prove predicate acts).
153. The decision not to increase the civil RICO plaintiff's evidentiary burden
with regard to the injury elements is the practical effect of the liberal courts rejec-
tion of a specialized type of civil RICO injury. The liberal courts discuss the issue
of the plaintiffs evidentiary burden only implicitly, however. Typically, the liberal
courts view the injury suffered by the civil RICO plaintiff as essentially that injury
caused by the predicate act violations. Moreover, the enterprise element is the means
by which the injury is inflicted, and the pattern of racketeering element is the precise
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The liberal courts also contended that a civil RICO violation, in
most cases, could not cause an injury which would be necessarily dif-
ferent from the injury caused by the predicate act violations."' The
liberal courts viewed the enterprise merely as the means by which
the predicate act violations were committed. The liberal courts did
not view this functional aspect of the enterprise and pattern of
racketeering activity elements as substantively altering the character
of the injury suffered by the plaintiff. The liberal courts also did not
view the imposition of restrictive limitations on the civil injury element
as logically compatible with RICO's structural framework. Therefore,
the types of civil RICO injuries recognized by the liberal courts were
as wide-ranging and diverse as those injuries caused by the predicate
act violations. Aside from this, other implications result from the
liberal interpretational approach.
C. Impact of the Liberal Interpretational Approach
One implication of the liberal approach was an interpretation
which complied with the mandate of the liberal construction clause.
Specifically, many of the liberal courts cited RICO's liberal construc-
tion clause as partial justification for their view of the civil injury
element.5 These courts perceived the liberal construction clause as
a means by which Congress emphasized its intention to draft a statute
of broad scope." Besides the term "injury," these courts also perceived
way in which the enterprise involvement causes the injury. Thus, the liberal courts
did not perceive a need for the plaintiff's evidentiary burden to be increased by way
to the civil injury element. See Furman, 741 F.2d at 529 (requiring greater proof is
tantamount to sterilizing civil RICO against the conduct Congress proscribed). See also,
Laterza, 581 F. Supp. at 414 (court is hard-pressed to say what type of injury is satisfac-
tory if courts require specialized injury). Additionally, some liberal courts view the
specialized injury requirement, especially in RICO cases based on business fraud, as
a veiled attempt to reimpose the rejected link to organized crime. Since Congress
expressly refused to make RICO status-based legislation for constitutional reasons,
the liberal courts likewise refuse to transform RICO into a status-based law and, thereby,
reject the specialized injury requirements. See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1356 (express link
to organized crime is the only way to distinguish RICO cases based on predicate acts
of business fraud from "garden variety" fraud cases).
154. "[RICO's broad] reach expressly included the 'garden variety' businessman
and commercial practices, so long as the activity satisfied the operative elements of
the statute." Public Interest, supra note 25, at 680-81 (emphasis in original).
155. This is in contrast to those courts which require additional particularity
of the injury in the pleadings. The strict courts feel such particularity is necessary
when a civil complaint charges criminal fraudulent activity. Miller & Olson, supra note
68, at 38.
156. Congress included the liberal construction clause so that RICO's remedial
purpose would not be undermined by the doctrine of strict construction. Liberal Con-
struction of Title IX, supra note 115, at 76.
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such terms as "person, enterprise," "conduct," and "participate" to
offer no significant means by which RICO could be legitimately
restricted.' 57 Since these courts found RICO to be of broad scope and
since the liberal construction clause reinforces the intent for a statute
of broad scope, these courts could partly justify a liberal view of the
civil injury element. By this means, the mandate of the liberal con-
struction clause was given full effect, as it pertained to the civil in-
jury element.
Many of the congressional purposes expressed in the statute and
in RICO's legislative history were also given effect by a liberal inter-
pretation. If no standing requirements were imposed, direct victims
of racketeering could avail themselves of the remedies which RICO
offers.'58 In this way, the racketeering victim could recover his losses
and could also divest the RICO violators of the economic power base
which accrued to them and which provided them continued financial
support for their illegal activities. Additionally, adoption of the liberal
view effectively complied with Congress' decision to avoid status-based
legislation by proscribing a certain type of conduct, as Congress defined
it in the statute."9 Since the liberal view did not entail a specialized
157. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 391 (noting that RICO's broad terms offer few toe-
holds to narrow RICO's application).
158. Swanson, 577 F. Supp. at 1320 (when direct victims cannot recover, pur-
pose of divesting racketeers from their profits is undermined). Accord Schacht, 711
F.2d at 1357-58 (purpose of attacking property interests undermined by competitive
injury requirement); Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1436 (citing Crocker National Bank v.
Rockwell International Corp. 555 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (N.D. Cal. 1982)) (requiring "special"
harm or anticompetitive effect undermines key purpose of RICO: divestment of ill-
gotten gains from racketeers). The argument for allowing direct-victim recovery is
also supported by the Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note
24. Specifically, the Congressional Statement cited several findings which arguably
encompass direct victims of racketeering: that organized crime derives its money from
various forms of "social exploitation"; victims include "innocent investors"; the "general
welfare of the nation and its citizens" is undermined by racketeering activity. Id.
159. See supra notes 25 and 26 for a discussion of Congress' decision not to draft
RICO as status-based legislation. Many courts have clearly decided not to limit RICO's
application to members of organized crime. See, e.g., Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1353 (adher-
ing to earlier rejection of organized crime requirement); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman &
Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 1982) (RICO forbids pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity whether or not organized crime is involved); Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1063 (RICO
not limited to context where ties to organized crime alleged); Hellenic Lines, 523 F.
Supp. at 247 (no requirement that defendants be members of a group operating out-
side law); United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230, 1240-41 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (statute
not restricted to organized crime). The liberal courts viewed any arguments 'to limit
civil RICO's use through the injury element as an attempt to distinguish general
business fraud or "garden variety" fraud cases from those cases where an organized
crime syndicate infiltrates a corporation and subsequently commits fraud to loot the
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 [1986], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss3/5
1986] RICO'S CIVIL INJURY ELEMENT
examination of the type of injury suffered, the court's attention
thereby concentrated upon the defendant's alleged illegal conduct. This
scrutiny of the defendant's acts was, in any case, ultimately necessary
to determine whether the defendant violated RICO. In short, the resul-
tant emphasis on the defendant's conduct as opposed to the plaintiffs
injury effectively precluded the creation of statutory loopholes through
which some defendants might otherwise have been able to slip.'" Thus,
the liberal view arguably advanced the policy choices Congress made
when it drafted RICO.
A liberal construction of RICO's civil injury element also advanced
the policy for liberality in pleadings.' 1 Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires specificity of pleading with regard to the
"circumstances constituting fraud."'62 In those RICO cases based upon
various predicate acts of fraud, the liberal courts did not seem to find
the civil injury element as one of the circumstances constituting the
fraud. The liberal courts argued that requiring the plaintiff to go
beyond alleging an injury to plead a specific type of injury would be
tantamount to requiring proof of the RICO violation before getting
to trial."3 These courts considered such a stringent standard to be
contrary to the policy for liberality in pleading."4
corporation's assets for the syndicate's benefit. The Schacht court argued that the only
way in which to make such a distinction between these types of fraud cases is to
require an organized crime nexus. 711 F.2d at 1356. The liberal courts refused to in-
corporate an organized crime nexus in order to distinguish "garden variety" fraud
cases from more sophisticated fraud cases. This reasoning has the practical effect of
avoiding status-based legislation by forcing the courts to concentrate on the defen-
dant's allegedly illegal conduct.
160. "Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more concern-
ed to avoid opening loopholes through which the minions of organized crime might
crawl to freedom than to avoid making garden-variety frauds actionable in federal
treble-damage proceedings-the price of eliminating all possible loopholes." Sutliff, Inc.
v. Donovan Companies, 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984).
161. Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1982) (liberal
pleading policy of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prevents dismissal of valid actions
for formal or technical reasons). For the argument that a court should construe the
pleadings in the plaintiffs favor, see Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086
(7th Cir. 1969). A court may also grant leave to correct even substantive errors in
the pleadings, if it assists the rendering of a decision on the merits and if no pre-
judice results to the defendants. See 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 11 15.08,
15.10 (2d ed. 1985); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
S 1474, 1487 (1971).
162. "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake shall be stated with particularity." FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
163. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 404 (greater specificity in alleging injury not required).
164. One court has stated that a description of the fraudulent scheme, its par-
ticipants, and a statement of when and where the fraud occurred satisfies Rule 9(b).
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In contrast to the purposes and policies advanced by the liberal
approach, an adverse impact of the liberal view manifested itself in
the consequent opportunity for a plaintiff to circumvent other com-
plete bodies of law. 65 This point is best exemplified through considera-
tion of the effect of two of RICO's enumerated predicate acts, mail
fraud and wire fraud, upon the federal securities law. The federal
securities laws and the underlying case precedent reflect a complex
matrix of substantive prohibitions, regulatory guidelines, legislative
policy decisions, and judicial standards. A plaintiff alleging fraud under
the securities laws faces a substantial burden of proof in establishing
such elements as standing and causation.166 The same plaintiff could
circumvent this burden imposed by the securities laws by utilizing
RICO's predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud.167 These two
Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1975). The Swanson court expressly adopted
this standard in the RICO context. 577 F. Supp. at 1321. See also Mauriber, 567 F.
Supp. at 1236 (complaint alleges requisite specificity for Rule 9(b) without relying on
conclusory allegations of fraud); Seville, 567 F. Supp. at 1156 (failure to describe date,
place, or time of any forms of interstate communication did not meet standard of par-
ticularity for predicate acts of mail and wire fraud). The policy for particularity of
Rule 9(b) must be read in conjunction with the policy for a short and plain statement
of the claim for relief of Rule 8(a) and the general policy for simplicity and flexibility
in pleading. Windsor, 564 F. Supp. at 280. This balancing requires the plaintiff to give
adequate notice for the defendant to answer the complaint; particulars of the fraudulent
scheme, the defendant's acts pursuant to the scheme, and the result of the scheme
are sufficient. Id.
165. The opportunity to circumvent other areas of the law is the primary aspect
of RICO which may lead to prosecutorial abuse. Even the courts adopting the liberal
view note this possibility for abuse. See, e.g., Mauriber, 567 F. Supp. at 1240 (noting
that plaintiff's use of RICO allows avoidance of damage provisions under the securities
laws); Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. at 1351 (recognizing that RICO could be used as an alter-
nate or cumulative remedy to securities fraud). A major premise underlying the Sedima
circuit court's restrictive reading of civil RICO is based upon this aspect of RICO.
The Sedima circuit court posited: "If Congress had intended to provide an alternate
and more attractive scheme for private parties to remedy violations of the securities
law - involving decades of statutes, regulations, commentaries, and jurisprudence - it
would at least have mentioned it." 741 F.2d at 492. The significance of this opportuni-
ty to circumvent other bodies of law is better understood in light of one advantage
which the plaintiff acquires. Specifically, under RICO the plaintiff gains access, through
discovery, to every aspect of the defendant's business for a period of ten years. Spencer
Companies, Inc. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) S 98,361 at 92,217 (D. Mass. 1981).
166. For example, an action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 requires that a plaintiff be an actual "purchaser" or "seller" of securities.
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
167. For example, establishing a RICO claim based on predicate acts of mail
fraud alone is relatively simple, because each mailing of a letter can constitute a separate
mail fraud violation. Any person who thinks deceitfully and mails two letters while
associated with an interstate enterprise has violated RICO. Horn, Civil RICO Action:
Weapon for Business Victims, Legal Times of Washington, Jan. 19, 1981, at 39, col. 1.
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predicate offenses present a plaintiff with a greater chance for suc-
cess in pursuing a RICO claim than he might have under the securities
laws. This observation is not meant to suggest that all plaintiffs who
might have a claim for a securities law violation will also have a RICO
claim. Only those plaintiffs who can establish RICO's enterprise and
pattern of racketeering elements in addition to proving the predicate
act violations will be able to forego bringing a claim under the
securities laws. The liberal courts argued that since mail fraud and
wire fraud are two of RICO's enumerated predicate acts, the
legitimacy of this option was not to be frustrated by the courts
through imposition of limitations upon the civil injury element.168
On the whole, the liberal interpretational approach significantly
broadened the scope of RICO's treble damage provision in comparison
to the strict interpretational approach. In Sedima, the Supreme Court
held that the federal courts must construe RICO's civil injury ele-
ment under the liberal interpretational approach.'69 Effectively, Sedima
resolves the interpretational conflict among the federal courts.
However, the Supreme Court's decision did not remove the potential
opportunity under civil RICO for a plaintiff to circumvent other bodies
of substantive law. Issues remaining unanswered after Sedima include
whether a civil RICO plaintiffs ability to circumvent other bodies of
law should be deemed undesirable and, if so, the proper manner by
168. The Haroco court noted that Congress was aware of existing criminal and
civil provisions for racketeering activity and also noted that Congress considered these
provisions inadequate against organized crime. 747 F.2d at 392 (citing Schacht, 711
F.2d at 1355-56). See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586-87 (Congress enacted RICO knowing
it would alter the role of the federal government in war against organized crime).
See Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 24, for the finding
that organized crime grows in the face of defects in the evidence-gathering process
of the law and the finding that existing sanctions and remedies are limited in scope
and impact. Congress enacted RICO to supplement, not supplant, existing remedies.
Haroco, 747 F.2d at 392.
One commentator has also argued that the civil RICO plaintiff functions as a
private attorney general. The civil RICO plaintiff assumes a burden analogous to that
of the public attorney general since the criminal elements are incorporated into the
civil statute. The benefit of this function of the civil RICO plaintiff is apparent in
cases where no criminal prosecution has been or will be commenced. Often, due to
lack of resources, many criminal activities go uninvestigated and unprosecuted. However,
the civil RICO plaintiff can bring such activity to the attention of public authorities
and, thereby, save expenditure of public funds and still promote vigorous law enforce-
ment. Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some Maturational Problems and Proposals
for Reform, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 285, 325 (1983). The treble damage provision en-
courages the private attorney general function of the civil RICO plaintiff and reflects
congressional awareness of the efficacy and validity of this antitrust remedy in the
civil RICO context. Patton, supra note 68, at 427.
169. - U.S. at - , 105 S. Ct. at 3277.
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which to remove this tactic from a plaintiffs arsenal of strategies.
Congress now has the task of resolving the issues which the federal
courts could not. To maintain RICO's force without sacrificing its utili-
ty, Congress must provide a balanced resolution to these issues.
V. COMMENTS AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION
Congress must enact an amendment to RICO if the conflict over
its civil provisions is to be resolved once and for all. Members of both
the House of Representatives and Senate have already come to this
realization and have introduced at least three proposed amendments. '
Basically, these proposed amendments would affect both the substan-
tive elements of a RICO violation and the civil injury element as its
pertains to a plaintiffs standing. Any of these proposed amendments
would not adequately resolve the issues still surrounding RICO. For
purposes here, the most significant issue arguably is disallowing a
plaintiff the ability to circumvent other areas of substantive law
without sacrificing all of RICO's force and utility. 1 ' Before forming
a resolution to this issue, Congress must first consider a fundamental
characteristic of RICO's statutory structure and some basic generaliza-
tions about its underlying congressional intent.
A fundamental characteristic of RICO's statutory structure is one
of separate treatment, as illustrated in the statutory language. Sec-
tion 196272 is the section which delineates the substantive RICO viola-
tions.'73 Section 1962 pertains to the conduct of the defendant and also
establishes the elements on which the plaintiff has the burden of proof.
On the other hand, section 19641 4 is the section which provides civil
relief. Section 1964 would seem to aim at helping the plaintiff by of-
fering such relief; it would not seem to aim at hindering the plaintiff
with restricted standing requirements.' In other words, section 1962
170. These proposed amendmends are reproduced in the appendix to this note.
171. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 486 (noting that broad interpretation of civil RICO
allows a plaintiff to bypass other remedial schemes created by Congress, most
significantly, in the securities area).
172. See supra note 58.
173. Section 1962 proscribes the basic substantive RICO violation. Section 1961
also provides substantive insight into section 1962. Section 1961 is the definitional
section for RICO, providing definitions for such terms as "racketeering activity," "enter-
prise," and "pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. S 1961 (1982).
174. See supra note 57.
175. Sedima, - U.S. at __, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 ("If the defendant
engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by [RICO], and
the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff
has a claim under S 1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an addi-
tional, amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement.").
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puts a burden of proof on the plaintiff while section 1964 provides
the plaintiff the benefit of relief. Such separate treatment of burden
and benefit in the statutory structure emphasizes the distinct pur-
pose and function of each of these sections. The reasons behind this
separate treatment are related to the original congressional intent
behind RICO.
Four generalizations, as documented in the legislative history,
reflect the original congressional intent behind RICO. First, RICO pro-
scribes a certain type of conduct, enterprise criminality, and not status,
such as organized crime affiliation. ' Second, Congress originally bor-
rowed the treble damage remedy from the antitrust area for deter-
rent purposes and not for the purpose of incorporating restrictive
standing and proximate cause limitations.' 7 Third, Congress intended
RICO to be a means by which ill-gotten profits would be taken from
RICO violators.' 8 Last, the statutory language is broad; therefore, the
plain meaning of the statute manifests a broad scope.' 9
These generalizations seem to have been determinative of RICO's
statutory structure. As one example, RICO's list of predicate acts'80
encompasses diverse types of illegal conduct. A congressional amend-
ment to RICO's civil remedy provision would most likely materially
alter RICO's statutory structure by making the standing requirements
more stringent.' More stringent standing requirements would con-
sequently alter the allocation of burden and benefit as presently
established in the statutory structure by increasing the plaintiff's
burden. Rather than proving mere injury to business or property, the
plaintiff would have to prove something like a competitive injury. Con-
gress must thoroughly consider the desirability of such a dramatic
alteration in RICO's statutory structure. The discussion of the strict
interpretational approach illustrated how requirements such as a com-
petitive injury or a racketeering enterprise injury effectively barred
the plaintiff from proceeding past the pleading stage.' Congress could
amend RICO without imposing this type of increased burden on the
plaintiff.
The better solution would be for Congress to limit any amend-
ment to the sections pertaining to the substantive elements of a RICO
176. See supra notes 25 and 26.
177. See supra notes 33, 36, and 41.
178. See supra notes 76 and 114.
179. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398 (arguing that broad langauge is necessary to ef-
fectuate statute with broad goals).
180. See supra note 60.
181. See supra notes 170 and 171.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98, 107-10, and 151-54.
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violation. In this way, Congress can more precisely define the con-
cept of enterprise criminality without imposing burdensome standing
requirements. Initially, Congress must consider the terms "racketeer"
and "racketeering activity" to be terms of a generic nature,'" just
as the terms "organized crime" and "white-collar crime" are considered
to be generic. Congressional re-examination of the "racketeer" and
"racketeering activity" concepts will force Congress to specify fur-
ther what it intends to be included within the meaning of these terms.
Such greater specification should thereby suggest the changes Con-
gress could make to RICO's statutory language.
In RICO's legislative history, repeated references are made to
"organized crime," "the syndicate," and the mafia. 1" Such evidence
suggests that Congress was essentially concerned about the activities
of "organized crime," as that term is colloquially known. However,
Congress did not want to create status-based legislation; so it rejected
an organized crime link under RICO. As a result, Congress extended
RICO beyond what is colloquially thought of as "organized crime."
Nevertheless, Congress did not go beyond this legislative decision to
determine, in explicit terms, how far the "racketeer" concept extended.
Rather, Congress determined to define the racketeer concept in terms
of conduct. In turn, this focus on conduct led to the proscription of
enterprise criminality as manifested through certain forms of
"racketeering activity."
The problem with the "racketeering activity" concept is that it
is based upon a series of predicate act violations; this list is so expan-
sive that no outer limit to the "racketeer" concept is ascertainable.
A better way of identifying the problem of enterprise criminality
would be to omit some of the offenses which are presently included
in the list of predicate acts.' 5 Specifically, the offenses which Con-
183. By assuming that "racketeer" and "racketeering activity" are terms of
a generic nature, this note suggests that these terms connote broad, but not precise,
concepts. Such an assumption requires further consideration of these terms by Con-
gress so that the legislative intent behind RICO is more precisely established.
184. Much of the interpretational conflict over civil RICO depends upon whether
RICO's scope extends beyond offenses characteristic of organized crime to include white
collar crime offenses. In its reading of the legislative history, the Sedima circuit court
strongly emphasized the repeated references to "organized crime," as that term is
colloquially used. 741 F.2d at 487. Finding that RICO's use extended beyond organized
crime in the colloquial sense, the Sedima circuit court held this to be an improper
use of civil RICO. Id. (arguing that the general purpose of RICO did not support the
"outrageous" uses to which civil RICO had been put). The Sedima circuit court conse-
quently required both a special injury limitation and a prior criminal conviction for
the predicate act violation to curb outrageous uses of civil RICO. Id.
185. Comments and conclusions in an ABA report suggest altering civil RICO's
predicate act requirements. See American Bar Association-Section of Criminal Justice,
[Vol. 20
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gress could remove are mail fraud and wire fraud.'" Alternatively,
Congress would not have to remove these offenses if it were to re-
quire that one act other than these fraud offenses was required to
constitute the two predicate acts necessary to form a pattern of
racketeering activity. At least any one of the other specified predicate
acts would be satisfactory, or Congress could choose only specific
predicate acts to go with mail and wire fraud. In this way, the
"racketeering activity" concept, in terms of conduct, would be better
delineated. Such a limitation would also necessarily give sharper form
to the concept of "racketeer," and thereby narrow RICO's scope to
those activities more commonly associated with "organized crime" as
it is known in the colloquial sense. By this process, Congress can ef-
fectively prevent RICO's encroachment into other bodies of law.
Therefore, Congress should either eliminate mail and wire fraud from
the list of predicate acts or alter the pattern of racketeering activity
requirements.
Enactment of either of these proposals would affect only the
substantive violation provisions of RICO and not its civil remedy pro-
vision. In this way, the amendment would not materially alter the
allocation of burden and benefit as it exists in RICO's statutory struc-
ture. Practically speaking, such an amendment would more precisely
define the concept of enterprise criminality, thereby affecting only
the plaintiffs burden of proof in regard to the substantive RICO viola-
tion. This effect would be to circumscribe the range of illegal conduct
Report to the House of Delegates (August 1982) (reproduced in INDIANA CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM (ICLEF), RICO-USE OF THE CIVIL STATUTE IN BUSINESS AND
SECURITIES FRAUD CASES IV-44 (1984)). While the ABA report strictly focused upon
reform of criminal RICO, many of the ABA's concerns are equally applicable to civil
RICO. The ABA's primary concern was to present a means by which to prevent misap-
plication of criminal RICO.
186. After studying actual cases, the ABA found that abuses of criminal RICO
resulted from indictments based solely upon mail fraud, wire fraud, and the interstate
transportation of stolen property. The ABA recommended that RICO's pattern of
racketeering should include one offense other than mail fraud, wire fraud, the interstate
transportation of stolen goods, and the sale and receipt of stolen goods to prevent
misuse of RICO. Id. at IV-50. As this recommendation bears upon civil RICO, the ABA
noted specifically:
When RICO is combined with mail fraud predicate offenses, the effect
is to federalize all torts involving business transactions in which a party
thinks deceitfully and uses the mails. This result is undesirable in two
respects: (1) the efficient operation of the federal courts will be significantly
impaired, if not crippled, by a tidal wave of civil RICO actions when plain-
tiffs become aware of the attractions of treble damages and recovery of
attorney's fees; and (2) the balance between state and federal power will
be substantially disrupted.
Id. at IV-51.
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to which RICO could apply without imposing restrictive standing re-
quirements. Conversely, RICO's utility would be virtually destroyed
by an amendment which both decreased the types of predicate acts
allowed and imposed restrictive standing requirements.
Moreover, enactment of either proposal would be enough to pre-
vent a plaintiff from circumventing other areas of substantive law.
Either proposal would not allow the plaintiff to rely entirely on allega-
tions of mail or wire fraud to establish the requisite pattern of
racketeering activity. In short, Congress can resolve the conflict over
civil RICO, but it should do so by amending only RICO's substantive
violation section and not its civil relief section.
VI. CONCLUSION
RICO is the broad means by which Congress attempted to reach
an admirable goal, the elimination of all the ways in which enterprise
criminality could undermine our national economy. Encountering much
difficulty in applying RICO, the federal district and appellate courts
employed conflicting interpretational approaches to RICO. The strict
interpretational courts imposed the competitive injury and racketeer-
ing enterprise injury limitations to prevent any prosecutorial abuse
of RICO. The liberal interpretational courts refused to restrict RICO
in this manner, because the liberal courts found no justification for
these limitations in either the statutory language or RICO's legislative
history. The Supreme Court resolved one aspect of this dispute by
holding that the civil injury element was to be liberally construed.
However, the Supreme Court has left Congress the task of deciding
issues which still cause controversy over civil RICO.
If there is to be a better expression of RICO's intended scope,
Congress must re-examine the substantive violation provisions of
RICO. Congress can do this by identifying the concept of enterprise
criminality more explicitly than it already has. RICO's enterprise
criminality concept can be further delineated either by the elimina-
tion of mail fraud and wire fraud from the list of predicate acts or
by alteration of the pattern of racketeering activity requirements. If
Congress were to do this, RICO's intended scope would be circumscribed
without destroying RICO's intended utility for both direct and indirect
victims of racketeering. Furthermore, this proposal would keep plain-
tiffs from circumventing other areas of substantive law. Enactment
of this proposal would best ensure that the legislative means effec-
tuate RICO's intended goals.
BETTY GLOSS
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APPENDIX
The three proposed amendments read as follows:
H.R. 2517
Mr. Conyers introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary [:]
A Bill
To amend chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONAL AMENDMENTS.
Section 1961 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out "racketeering"
and inserting "predicate criminal" in lieu thereof;
(2) so that paragraph (4) reads as follows:
"(4) 'enterprise' means a business or other similar
business-like undertaking by an association of persons,
whether organized for legitimate or illegitimate purposes,
and includes a government or government agency;";
(3) so that paragraph (5) reads as follows:
"(5) 'pattern of criminal activity' means two or more
acts of predicate criminal activity, separate in time and
place -;
"(A) each of which occurred not more than five years
before the indictment is found, or information is instituted,
that names such acts as predicate criminal activity;
"(B) all of which are not violations of the same provi-
sion of law, if that provision of law is
"(i) the second undesignated paragraph of section 2314
(relating to the transportation of stolen goods, securities,
moneys, fraudulent state tax stamps, or articles used in
counterfeiting) of this title;-
"(ii) section 1341 (relating to mail fraud) of this title;
or
"(iii) section 1342 (relating to wire fraud) of this title;
and
"(C) that are interrelated by a common scheme, plan,
or motive, and are not isolated events;";
(4) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (9)
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(5) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph
(10) and inserting ";and" in lieu thereof; and
(6) by adding at the end the following:
"(11) 'criminal syndicate' means an enterprise of five
or more persons, a significant purpose of which is to engage
on a continuing basis in a pattern of criminal activity, other
than a pattern of criminal activity consisting solely of con-
duct constituting a felony under section 1084 of this title
or under the law of a State relating to engaging in a gambl-
ing business.".
SEC. 2. OFFENSE AMENDMENTS.
Section 1962 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended -
(1) by inserting after the heading of such section the
following new subsection:
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
organize, own, control, finance, or otherwise participate in
a supervisory capacity in a criminal syndicate.";
(2) by redesignating subsections (a), (b), and (c) as
subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively;
(3) in the subsection redesignated as subsection (b)
by paragraph (2)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering activity" each place
it appears and inserting "criminal activity" in lieu thereof;
and
(B) by inserting "knowingly" before "to use or invest";
(4) in the subsection redesignated as subsection (c) by
paragraph (2)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering activity" and insert-
ing "criminal activity" in lieu thereof; and
(B) by inserting "knowingly" before "to acquire or
maintain":
(5) in the subsection redesignated as subsection (d) by
paragraph (2)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering activity" and insert-
ing "criminal activity" in lieu thereof; and
(B) by inserting "knowingly" before "to conduct or
participate"; and
(6) by striking out the subsection designated (d)
without regard to the redesignations made by paragraph (2).
SEC. 3. SECTION 1963 AMENDMENTS.
Section 1963(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended -;
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 [1986], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss3/5
RICO'S CIVIL INJURY ELEMENT
(1) by striking out "any provision of section 1962 of
this chapter" and inserting "section 1962" in lieu thereof;
(2) by inserting "in the case of a violation of a subsec-
tion other that subsection (a) of such section" after "shall"
the first place it appears; and
(3) by inserting "and in the case of a violation of
subsection (a) of such section be fined not more than
$250,000 or imprisoned not more that 30 years, or both,"
after "or both,".
SEC. 4. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS
HEADING FOR CHAPTER.-The heading of chapter
96 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking
out "RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS" and inserting "CRIMINAL ENTER-
PRISES AND CORRUPTION OF ENTERPRISES" in lieu
thereof.
(b) TABLE OF CHAPTERS.-The table of chapters
at the beginning of part I of title 18, United States Code,
is amended so that the item relating to chapter 96 is
amended to read as follows:
"96. Criminal enterprises and corruption of enterprises
...... 1961".
H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
H.R. 2943
Mr. Boucher introduced the following bill, which was re-
ferred to the Committee on the Judiciary [:]
A Bill
To amend section 1964 of title 18, United States Code, with
respect to certain civil remedies for persons injured by
racketeering acitivity.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
section 1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by striking out "a violation" and inserting "con-
duct in violation" in lieu thereof;
(2) by striking out "therefor" and inserting "any per-
son who engaged in that conduct and, with respect to such
conduct, was convicted of racketeering activity or of a viola-
tion of section 1962" in lieu thereof;
(3) by inserting a comma after "district court"; and
19861
Gloss: The Continuing Conflict Over Limitations on RICO'S Civil Injury E
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1986
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.20
by adding at the end the following: "A civil action
under this subsection may not be commenced against a
defendant later than one year after the entry of the latest
judgment of conviction against the defendant for racketeer-
ing activity or a violation of section 1962 with respect to
the conduct out of which such action arises.".
H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., lst Sess. (1985).
S. 1521
Mr. Hatch introduced the following bill, which was referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary [:]
A Bill
To clarify the intent of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act with respect to private civil actions.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
subsection (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States Code,
is amended to read as follows:
"(c)(1) Any person suffering competitive, investment,
or other business injury as a result of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter involving a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including reasonable at-
torney's fees.
"(2) For purposes of this subsection, 'pattern of
racketeering activity' shall require that at least one act of
racketeering activity shall be an act of racketeering activ-
ity other than-
"(i) an act indictable under section 1341 (mail fraud)
of title 18, United States Code;
"(ii) an act indictable under section 1343 (wire fraud)
of title 18, United States Code; or
"(iii) an act which is an offense involving fraud in the
sale of securities.
(3) If the court determines that a suit brought under
this subsection was frivolous and without merit, the court
may, at its discretion, award the cost of the suit including
reasonable attorney's fees to the defendant.".
S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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